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Resumen: Se analizan los determinantes de los márgenes de precio costo de acuer-
do con el enfoque tradicional de organización industrial. Los márgenes 
de precio costo se hacen función de los índices de concentración y el 
grado de penetración de importaciones. Los resultados indican que 
las importaciones reducen los márgenes de precio-costo de la industria 
doméstica. En el periodo posterior a la liberalización comercial el im-
pacto de la concentración disminuye. Con ajustes por comportamiento 
cíclico de los márgenes de precio costo, se muestra que los estudios 
de sección cruzada tienden a sesgar las estimaciones. Se distingue en-
tre bienes durables y no-durables y se encuentra que la concentración 
afecta el márgen de precio costo de los durables. 
Abstract: The paper analyzes the determinants of price-cost margins following 
traditional industrial organization approaches. The price-cost margins 
are made function of the concentration index, and the degree of import 
penetration. We find that imports act as a market disciplining device 
that reduces the price-cost margins of the domestic industry. After 
trade liberalization, the impact of concentration diminishes. Control-
ling for cyclical behavior of the price-cost margins the paper shows 
that cross-section studies tend to bias the estimates. A distinction be-
tween durables and non-durables is made, finding strong evidence for 
concentration to affect the price-cost margins of durables. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1986, the Mexican government initiated an aggressive liberalization 
process. In 1985, the average tariff was 23.5 percent, and 92.2 percent 
of national production was protected by import license requirements. 
By the end of 1987, the average tariff was reduced to 11.8 percent 
and import license requirements covered only 25.4 percent of national 
production with a maximum rate of 20 percent. This process should 
have had an impact on the competitive regime experienced by the 
Mexican manufacturing sector. This paper estimates a model that 
studies the impact of trade liberalization and the impact of other 
variables on price cost margins.
1 
Before the advent of the new empirical industrial organization 
approach as surveyed in Bresnahan (1989), empirical industrial orga-
nization literature applied most of its resources to learn from industry 
behavior. A seminal study in this tradition is the one published by 
Bain in 1951. The typical study in this vein of research put a set 
of industries together for a single period of time and analyzed, with 
regression techniques, the determinants of profitability or price mar-
gins. Schmalensee argued in favor of this approach. In his 1985 paper 
he defended the industry as unit of analysis.
2 
A problem with cross section studies lies in that they do not allow 
for industry specific characteristics. In this study we have assembled 
the data of 63 industries that runs from 1980-1998.
3 The pooling 
of time series and cross sections allows us to study the determinants 
of price margins, while allowing for unobservable individual industry 
effects, thereby solving potential biases shown in OLS estimates. 
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of industry mar-
gins for the Mexican manufacturing sector. We analyze the impact 
of trade liberalization on price cost margins and study the impact of 
the business-cycle on the determinants of price-cost margins. This 
last topic is important because, as some oligopoly models have pre-
dicted (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Haltiwanger and Harrington, 
1991; Green and Porter, 1984; and Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico, 
2002) price-cost margins may change across the cycle. Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) have pre-
1 See Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986 a, b) for similar studies in 
other countries. 
2 McGahan (1999) argues that very recently some others have turned back to 
the industry as unit of analysis. 
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dieted that concentrated industries tend to collude less during booms 
to prevent defections. Athey Bagwell and Sanchirico (2002) showed 
that the prediction of countercyclical pricing made by Rotemberg et 
al. is robust to schemes with private cost information. This cyclical 
variation may also interact with the import penetration ratio and the 
capital output ratio. We investigate these possibilities. 
The use of concentration as an explanatory variable started early 
in the cross section studies (see for example Collins and Preston, 
1969). It emerges also naturally from one stage non-cooperative quan-
tity games. The prediction from these models states that, other things 
being equal, a higher degree of concentration in an industry should 
lead to a larger (average) Lerner index. It is this prediction that leads 
competition commissions to calculate concentration index as an indi-
cation of the presence of substantial market power (poder sustancial 
de mercado) exerted by a firm or by a whole industry. 
Imports act as a market power disciplining device. Again, non-
cooperative one stage games can be used to analyze the impact of 
imports on the Lerner index. The results depend upon the assumed 
behavior of the importing sector. If imports are inelastically sup-
plied then non-cooperative quantity games predict that the Lerner 
index is affected through an adjustment of the concentration index. 
If imports have some degree of elasticity, a change in the elasticity 
of import supply changes the Lerner index of domestic firms. This 
approach assumes that the importing sector behaves competitively. If 
information is disaggregated enough so that it allows for calculation 
of the shares of large firms on imports and we can obtain data on 
stocks, hours for this sector, etc., then we could, in principle, model 
part of the importing sector as oligopolist and the other part as com-
petitive. However, that information is not available for this study and 
we model this sector as competitive. 
The main results are as follows. The change in the trade regime 
affects the impact of concentration on the Lerner index. The size of 
the coefficient of the concentration variable diminishes as we move 
from the pre-liberalization period to the post-liberalization period. 
Competition from international products changes the residual de-
mand faced by domestic firms generating a lower price margin for 
a given level of concentration. The signs of the impact of the vari-
ables are fairly robust towards changes in the specification of the 
equations. After the liberalization period, we find for the whole man-
ufacturing sector that concentration has, in a boom, a lower impact 
on the price-cost margin. Apparently, concentrated industries have 
less collusive agreements in booms. There is a difference in the im-180 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
pact of explanatory variables according to the type of good (durable 
or non-durable). 
2. Methodology 
Consider a one stage Cournot model and foreign competition from 
abroad. We consider the foreign sector as behaving competitively. 
As explained by Tirole (1988), a Cournot oligopolist is a monopolist 
over its residual demand. Thus it can be easily proved that its Lerner 
index is equal to the following: 
P-C' 1 
with P denoting price, C' marginal cost and ef the residual de-
mand elasticity of a Cournot competitor. If we incorporate the supply 
of foreign imports, then the residual demand of a national Cournot 
oligopolist is equal to the following: 
d „cd s 
1i =Qi - qf 
With qf representing the residual demand that firm i faces after 
taking into account the behavior of the (domestic) oligopolies and 
the foreign competition; qf denotes the residual demand firm i faces 
after taking into account the oligopolistic behavior of the domestic 
competitors; q) is the supply of the foreign firms. Differentiating 





we get the following expression: 
d=






ef is the residual demand elasticity that faces the domestic oligopolist 
firm, em is the market elasticity of demand, Si is the share of firm 
i in domestic production, af is the share of the foreign firms in the 
4 This is a standard residual demand model of a Cournot competitor with 
fixed foreign imports. DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 181 
domestic market, e
a
f is the supply elasticity of imports. Given that the 
Lerner index of a firm is equal to the inverse of its residual elasticity 
of demand, the Lerner index of a domestic oligopoly that faces foreign 
competition through competitive imports is given by: 





As the literature traditionally proceeds we can weight the Lerner 
index by the share of firm i, adding over all firms and assuming lin-





L is the weighted (by shares) Lerner index. If there is no elasticity 
of supply of foreign imports, ej = 0, then the formula states that the 
impact of imports is just an adjustment of the Herfindahl index. 
The estimating equations are influenced by the last equation. 
According to this, concentration has a positive impact on the aver-
age Lerner index and the imports to market ratio affects the average 
Lerner index negatively. 
The paper estimates a model in which the price cost margin 
(PCM=Lerner Index) is made a function of several variables, among 
them, the C4 concentration index,
5 the import penetration ratio (usu-
ally defined as M/VA, imports over value added) and the capital-
output ratio. The first two variables are suggested by economic prin-
ciples as illustrated in equation (0). The third is used to control for 
technological heterogeneity among industries.
6 We also investigate 
the cyclical properties of the markup. We use four digit data for the 
Mexican manufacturing sector obtained from the Encuesta industrial 
published by INEGI. The data runs from 1975 to 1998. We will be 
estimating regression equations of the following sort: 
5 We use the four firm concentration ratio as there is no information for the 
Herfindahl index. However, there is evidence that both indexes are highly corre-
lated (Nelson, 1963). The four firm concentration ratio corresponds in this case to 
the sales of the largest four plants in the industry over total sales of the industry. 
The information that Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática, 
INEGI, gathers is at the plant level, which is the reason for calculating this index. 
6 We should expect a positive relation between the capital-output ratio and 
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PCM = f{CA,M*,K/Q) (1) 
Where CA corresponds to the CA concentration ratio, M* corre-
sponds to the import penetration ratio and K/Q refers to the cap-
ital/output ratio. The inclusion of CA corresponds to the intuition 
that highly concentrated industries may have a larger price cost mar-
gin.
7 Besides the explanation advanced in equation (0), traditional 
folk theorems in the repeated game literature could be consistent with 
this prediction. M*, which corresponds to the import penetration ra-
tio,
8 is usually a reflection of the degree of protection of the economy. 
As indicated in (0), a reduction of protection in the economy has an 
impact on the competitive regime of the industry, changing the Lerner 
index of domestic firms set' Finally, K/Q is the degree of capital 
intensity in the industry. We should expect the price cost margin to 
vary across industries in accordance with the degree of capital inten-
sity The aim of including this variable is to pick up technological 
heterogeneity.
1
0 These explanatory variables are later combined with 
cyclical variables that interact with them to analyze the behavior of 
price cost margins. If the interaction of the cyclical variables with 
our standard variables appears to be statistically significant, it will 
imply that cross-section studies do not reflect accurately the impact 
of these explanatory variables on price cost margins. Depending upon 
the year of comparison, good or bad, we may get a different impact of 
7 The paper follows the literature assuming that the concentration ratio is not 
endogenous. See Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986 a, b). Furthermore, we 
tested for endogeneity of the concentration index and found no evidence of it. The 
instruments used are lagged values of concentration measures and lagged values 
of the capital-output variable. See footnote 10. 
8 This variable is measured in several ways by the literature: it could be equal 
to the ratio of imports to total sales or to the ratio of imports to value added. 
In some cases the variable corresponds to the ratio of the trade balance with 
respect to total sales or value added. The import penetration rate is modeled as 
exogenous, because hausman tests do not reject the hypothesis of no-endogeneity. 
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986 b); and Pugel (1980) report OLS results. 
Grether (1996) also reports the OLS results for the Mexican case. 
9 A change in protection, for example a reduction in quotas, changes the 
elasticity of supply of foreign firms. 
1
0 To test for robustness we estimated the model with the inclusion of a labor 
productivity variable. The inclusion of this variable did not change most of the 
results of the paper. We decided to exclude the variable given that there is no a 
priori theoretical justification to include it. DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 183 
the four firm concentration ratio, the capital intensity variable and the 
import-penetration ratio on price cost margin. The sole use of cross 
section studies may give us a bad measurement of industry variables 
on price setting behavior. Thus, to account for cyclical interactions 
we estimate the following system: 
PCM = /(C4, M/TS, K/Q, CA*D, M/TS*D, K/Q*D) (2) 
with D reflecting the cyclical variable. 
The PCM variable was calculated, using standard formulas 
PCM =
 TOTA
L SALES-WAGES-INTERMEDIATE INPUTS (3) 
There are several arguments that highlight the biases inherent in 
these measurements; however we are mostly interested in viewing the 




Regarding the concentration index, we only have observations 
for the following years: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1988, 1993, and 1999. 
For the remaining years we used interpolation techniques, basically 
polynomial interpolation (splines) to get the other observations. We 
use the four firm concentration ratio as it is the only index available.
1
2 
We run regressions for the whole manufacturing sectors for the 
durables industries pooled together and for non-durables; all regres-
sions are run with fixed effects. 
3. Results 
In table 1 we show the concentration index divided by quintile and 
the corresponding price cost margin. The calculation is made for each 
year from 1980-1998. We have 63 industries included in the sample. 
See the appendix for details. 
For all years, there is a positive correlation between the index of 
concentration and the markup. For several years there are cases in 
which concentration increases are not accompanied with correspond-
ing increases in the price cost margin. Although for some theories, 
1
1 The price cost margin is equal to the Lerner index if variable cost is an 
appropriate surrogate for marginal costs. 
1
2 The index is obtained from INEGI, the index is calculated based only upon 
domestic sales. Thus it is perfectly consistent with the theoretical model devel-
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there is a correlation between the concentration margin and industry 
profitability,
1
3 there are some other variables that affect this latter 
variable. Besides, the potential impact of concentration, price cost 
margins should depend on other variables such as the openness of the 
industry and the impact of capital intensity. When considering all 
these potential effects we will see later in the regression results that 
concentration does affect the markup positively. 
Before going into the results we present in graph 1 the measure 
of price cost-margin obtained from the data for the whole manufac-
turing sector by using the formula stated in equation (3), and the 
same measurement with the use of the Hall approach (1988) to the 
estimation of price-markups. Briefly, the Hall approach suggests the 
implementation of instrumental variables into Solow equation (Solow, 
1957). The rate of growth of the labor-capital ratio is projected on 
the space spanned by pro-cyclical instruments. The identification as-
sumption states that the Solow residual in levels follows a random 
walk with drift. By projecting the rate of growth of the labor-capital 
ratio in the space spanned by the instruments, Hall finds the esti-
mated coefficient (the level of market power) that makes the Solow 
residual orthogonal to business cycle fluctuations. However, due to 
the criticisms of Nelson and Starz (1988), the literature has also made 
use of estimates with traditional OLS techniques. Graph 1 was made 
by running Hall's equation with an OLS technique in the cross section 
of industries included for this study. So, we have one estimate for the 
markup for each year for the whole manufacturing sector. The PCM 
was calculated as stated in equation (3) by adding each individual 
piece of data needed, across the whole manufacturing sector. 
Graph 1 shows a similar trend of the PCM calculated according 
to Hall and the PCM from equation (3). 
3.1. Equation 1 Results 
First, we estimate equation (1) under the assumption of linearity in 
the functional form (linear in parameters). The results are shown 
for the period 1980-1998 and then by sub-periods, 1980-1985 and 
1986-1998. In table 2 we show the estimates for equation (1). We 
pooled together all industries to obtain an estimate for the whole 
manufacturing sector. To control for industry specific factors, we 
1
3 As illustrated in equation (0), under Cournot competition the sum of the 
firms profits is proportional to the Herfindahl concentration index. 186 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
estimate a fixed effects model.
1
4 Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
In this table, the variable M* is defined as the ratio of imports to 
value added. As shown in the table 2, the coefficients on K/Q and 




We can see in the results from table 2 that the ratio of imports 
to value added becomes significant in the period in which Mexico 
changes its trade regime to implement a liberalization process. As 
mentioned previously, in 1985, the average tariff was 23.5 percent and 
92.2 percent of national production was protected by import license 
1
4 The fixed effect method allows us to control for industry specific charac-
teristics, thus allowing us to avoid potential biases in the estimation that might 
occur if we were to follow a pure OLS approach. Random effects estimates do not 
differ substantially in most of the results of this paper. Given that we are more 
concerned about the potential omission of industry specific variables, and that 
fixed effects are robust to this omission we would rather stay with fixed effects. DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 187 
requirements. By the end of 1987, the average tariff was reduced to 
11.8 percent and the import license requirements covered only 25.4 
percent of national production with a maximum rate of 20 percent. 
The sign of the coefficient for the import penetration ratio, M*, is 
negative, showing that import competition diminishes domestic price-
margins. The coefficient on K/Q is positive for the whole period 
and for the sub-period 1986-1998. We should expect that capital 
intensive industries experience larger markup due to the sunkness of 
the investment and the need to recover fixed costs. The literature has 
found this coefficient to be positive (Collins and Preston, 1969; and 
Domowitz, Hubbard, and Peterson, 1986a). 
Table 2 
Pooled Regressions - Standard Measure of Import Penetration 
C4  K/Q  M*  ADJ.R2 
Whole Manufacturing Sector 





















*Significant at 5% **Significant at 10% 
M* is calculated as the ratio of imports to value added. 
When we pass from the 1980-1985 period (pre-liberalization pe-
riod), to the post-liberalization period (1986-1998), we see a signifi-
cant reduction in the impact of the concentration index on the price-
cost margin. As the economy became more open, the pro-competitive 
impact of imports reduced the impact of concentration on price-cost 
margins. We should expect this behavior from standard oligopoly 
models. Although domestic concentration persists, the competition 
of imports makes more elastic the residual demand faced by each 




See Geroski and Jacquemin (1981) and equation (0). 188 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
We ran specification tests to test for the endogeneity of M*. 
The results show that imports are not endogenous when we used as 
instruments two lagged values of the import penetration rate and 
two lagged observations of the capital-output ratio. For 1980-1985, 
the test does not reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity. A similar 
outcome occurred from the 1986-1998 period.
1
6 For 1986-1998, the 
test did not reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity.
1
7 
For concentration we followed a similar procedure. The tests for 
the period 1980-1985 and the period 1986-1998 do not reject the hy-
pothesis of no endogeneity.
1
8 We used as instruments the two lagged 
values of concentration and the two lagged values of the capital out-
put ratio. For both M* and the concentration index, the instruments 
used are well correlated with the explanatory variables. 
In table 3 we include an alternative measure of import penetra-
tion: instead of looking at the ratio of imports to value-added, we look 
at the ratio of imports to total sales. As before, we should expect that 
more open industries have reduced price-cost margins. 
Table 3 
Pooled Regressions - An Alternative 
Measure of Import Penetration 
C4  K/Q  M/TS  ADJ.R2 
Whole Manufacturing Sector 
1980-1998  0.06**  -0.039**  -3.49*  0.52 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
1980-1985  0.42*  -0.089*  -15.7*  0.58 
(0.09)  (0.03)  (4.64) 
1986-1998  0.158*  0.06  -5.45*  0.69 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.94) 
*Significant at 5%  **Significant at 10% 
The external competition variable affects negatively and signif-
icantly the price-cost margins of the manufacturing sector for the 
i
b See the tables in appendix 2. 
1
7 Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986 b), were aware of potential endo-
geneity of this variable. However, they reported the OLS results. 
1
8 See appendix 2 for the results. DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 189 
three periods studied, including the 1980-1985 period. This last re-
sult is different from the previous table. In table 3, the CA index is 
significant for all periods considered. In contrast with the previous ta-
ble, the sign of the coefficient for the capital-output ratio is negative 
and significant for the whole period, a surprising result. However, 
the last period (after liberalization) shows a positive coefficient for 
this variable (although non-significant). As before, the concentra-
tion coefficient is lower for the post-liberalization period, showing the 
disciplining impact of imports. 
3.2. Equation 2 Results (Cyclical Effects) 
We include pro-cyclical variables to account for the possibility of vari-
ations in the markup across the business cycle. We included the mea-
surement of unemployment as defined in INEGI. The basic equation to 
be estimated is the one defined in (2) above. The variable D in that 
equation is the unemployment rate as defined in INEGI (U in table 
4). The results are reported in table 4. 
Table 4 
Pooled Regressions with the Inclusion 
of Anti-cyclical Variables (Unemployment) 
1980-1998  1980-1985  1986-1998 




































ADJ.R2  0.52  0.58  0.68 
*Significant at 5% ^Significant at 10% 190 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
The inclusion of anti-cyclical variables in the regression does ap-
pear to have a significant impact on the behavior of the price-cost 
margins. For the period 1986-1998, the coefficient on C4 still has a 
significant impact on the price-cost margin and the anti-cyclical vari-
able U, interacted with C4 does not appear statistically significant. 
However, the cyclical variable does affect the import-penetration rate. 
Whenever there is a recession in the economy (the unemployment 
rate is high) the disciplining impact of imports is increased. Thus, 
industries with a great import-penetration ratio experience a stronger 
competitive impact from imports whenever there is a recession in the 
economy. This fact is also observed for the whole period (1980-1998). 
As the import-penetration rate increases, the price-cost margin be-
comes more pro-cyclical. Business cycles appear to affect the impact 
of concentration for the 1980-1985 period. As the economy went into 
a recession, the impact of concentration on the price-cost margin in-
creased. More concentrated industries tend to have a larger price-cost 
margin in the downturns. For this period of time, more concentrated 
industries lead to more anti-cyclical behavior on the part of price-
cost margins. This fact is consistent with the period of observation 
in which the relative closedness of the Mexican economy isolated con-
centrated industries from competition.
1
9 The inclusion of the un-
employment rate as a single regressor did not render a significant 
We also considered the potential impact of business cycles by 
including a dummy variable that has the value of one whenever the 
economy is growing and a zero value if the economy is experiencing 
a recession (D in table 5). We report the results in table 5. 
Table 5 
Pooled Regressions with the Inclusion 
of Pro-Cyclical Variables (Dummy) 
1980-1998  1980-1985  1986-1998 







y The result that shows that concentration afreets in an anti-cyclical way the 
price-cost margins is not robust to a change in the definition of the cyclical vari-
able. In the following table, we will incorporate another measure that gives us 
a different prediction. A possible explanation for the divergence in predictions 
might come from the fact that the unemployment rate in Mexico is not too re-
sponsive to cyclical fluctuations (due to the absence of unemployment insurance). DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 191 
Table 5 
(continued) 
1980-1998  1980-1985  1986-1998 






























ADJ.R2  0.52  0.57  0.69 
*Significant at 5% **Significant at 10% 
As we observe in the last table, only the dummy that multiplies 
the concentration index appears significant. This happens only for 
the 1980-1985 period and for the 1986-1998 period. For the 1980¬
1985 sub-period, we see that as the economy goes into a recession, 
the impact of concentration on price cost margins decreases, while the 
opposite occurs in a boom. For the 1986-1998 period, the opposite 
occurs, as the economy goes into a recession, the impact of concen-
tration on price cost margin is increased and the impact is reduced in 
a boom. We notice also that for the 1986-1998 period, the coefficient 
of M and K are significant and have the expected signs. However, 
there is no apparent significant impact of the pro-cyclical variable for 
these variables. Booms and recessions do not appear to generate a 
different impact from these variables when we measure the change of 
regime with the dummy. The change in the impact of concentration 
across booms and recessions (for the 1986-1998 period) is consistent 
with the story about price wars in booms and collusive agreement in 
recessions (See Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986: Haltiwanger and Har-
rington, 1991; and Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico, 20 02).
2
0 As the 
M Haltiwanger and Harrington modify the Rotemberg and Saloner model to 
allow for models in which the current demand generates expectations about future 192 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
economy moves into a boom, the impact of concentration on price-cost 
margins is diminished, because firms (rationally) sustain less collusive 
agreements to avoid defections and the opposite occurs in a recession. 
A comparison between table 4 and 5 show that, regardless of 
the interacting variable, we have almost the same inferences found 
before in table 2. The signs of the coefficients for M, C4 and K 
are similar between them and with those shown in table 2.
2
1 Also, 
the significance of the impact of the variable (the coefficient of C4, 
K and M) is not affected by the inclusion of the additional vari-
ables (the interacted terms, C4*U, K*U, U*M in the first regression 
and C4*D,K*D,M*D in the second). This is an indication of the 
robustness of the results.
2
2 
This inference related to the impact of the business cycle en-
hances the approach used in this paper. The pooling of cross section 
and time series allows us to study the impact of the business cy-
cle on the estimated coefficients. The simple cross-section approach 
cannot account for these variations; thus, estimates obtained with 
cross-section studies -similar to those used in traditional industrial 




3.3. Analysis by Type of Good 
Next, we study the impact of these variables by dividing by type of 
good -durables and non-durables-. Table 6 reports the results for 
these categories. 
The table shows that concentration impacts the price cost mar-
gins of durable goods for all periods considered. For non-durable 
goods, this occurs only for the 1980-1985 period. These results are 
demand. They also find out that collusion is difficult to sustain during expan-
sions. However they modify slightly the Rotemberg and Saloner conclusion to 
show that even during recessions collusion is difficult to sustain. They also find 
counter-cyclical pricing. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico found similar results to 
Rotemberg and Saloner in an imperfect information environment. 
2
1 When we talk about the signs we talk about the value of the coefficients in 
a recession and in a boom^l he value given by the interacting coefficients 
change the sign ot the coefficient oi M , K and O 4 when added to them. 
Here we refer to robustness with regard to a change in the specification of 
^equation by the addition of cyclical variables. 
See Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986 a, b). DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 193 
consistent with those found in studies of other countries. In a study 
for the US, Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) found also that 
concentration does not appear to impact the price cost margins of 
non-durable goods. Imports have a significant impact for both types 
of goods for the period after trade liberalization (1986-1998) and, 
in both cases, imports reduce the price-cost margins of domestic in-
dustries. The capital-output ratio affects significantly the price cost 
margins of non-durables for the after trade liberalization period. For 
this period and for durable goods, there is no significant impact of 
the capital-output ratio. However, this variable affects in a signifi-
cant manner and negatively, the price-cost margins of durables for 
the whole period. 
Table 6 
Pooled Regressions bye Type of Good 
(Durables and Non-durables) 
C4  K/Q  M*  ADJ.R2 
Durables 
1980-1998  0.118*  -0.096*  -0.184  0.56 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.156) 
1980-1985  0.29*  -0.27*  0.783**  0.52 
(0.15)  (0.09)  (0.47) 
1986-1998  0.299*  -0.39  -0.46*  0.69 
(0.06)  (0.3)  (0.173) 
Non-Durables 
1980-1998  0.04  0.05  -0.29  0.44 
(0.05)  (0.03)  (0.31) 
1980-1985  0.55*  -0.02  -1.1  0.62 
(0.14)  (0.05)  (1.74) 
1986-1998  0.05  0.09*  -0.49**  0.64 
(0.06)  (0.04)  (0.28) 
*Significant at 5% **Significant at 10% 
M* is calculated as the ratio of imports to value added. 
The variation of the sign of the capital-output ratio in the dif-
ferent regressions analyzed so far demands an intuitive explanation. 
One potential explanation is related with the sunkness of the stocks 194 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
of capital and the different periods of crisis and expansions observed 
throughout this period of analysis coupled with liberalization. One 
should expect that in normal times the capital-output ratio should 
be positively related to price cost margins; however, in times of reces-
sion, the capital is sometimes sunk and the price cost margins may 
be affected by other variables, thus affecting the positive relation be-
tween the two. Economic theory suggests that when capital is sunk, 
firms will still operate even if they cannot recover the sunk costs. We 
should point out also that, for almost all tables shown, this variable 
is positive for the after-trade liberalization period. 
We also analyze the potential cyclical behavior of the coefficients 
for these two types of goods. 
Table 7 
Pooled Regressions: Non-durable Goods, 
Controlling for Cyclical Effects 
1980-1998  1980-1985  1986-1998 




































ADJ.R2  0.45  0.62  0.65 
*Significant at 5% **Significant at 10% 
For the case of non-durables, these coefficients are affected by 
business cycles. For all three periods considered, the disciplining im-
pact of imports is considerably less important in periods of economic 
growth. In fact, the impact of imports for all three periods considered DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 195 
vanishes (statistically) in a boom.
2
4 Also, for these types of goods, 
the coefficients of M, CA and K for the after-liberalization period 
have the expected sign, and the coefficient of CA has become signif-
icant when we include the cyclical variables (DM, DC A and DK). 
This result together with the significance of DM and DC, suggests 
that the way our explanatory variables impact the price cost margin 
of non-durables is affected by cyclical fluctuations during this period 
(1986-1998). We also notice, for the after-liberalization period and for 
these goods, that the impact of concentration diminishes as we pass 
from a recession to an expansion. This evidence is consistent with 
price wars in booms. During expansions, the gains from deviating 
are larger; thus, concentrated industries have a lower impact on the 
level of collusion. Firms sustain a lower level of collusion to prevent 
the appearance of defectors (see Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986, and 
Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico, 2002, for environments with imper-
fect information). 
Table 8 
Pooled Regressions: Durable Goods, 
Controlling for Cyclical Effects 
1980-1998  1980-1985  1986-1998 




































ADJ.R2  0.56  0.56  0.70 
*Significant at 5% **Significant at 10% 
^ We calculated the standard deviation of the sum of the non-interacted coef-
ficient and the interacted coefficient, and in all cases the sum is not significant in 
periods of economic growth. 196 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
For the case of durables, we do not see a significant impact of M 
and DM for the whole period (1980-1998). For the after liberalization 
period, none of our explanatory variables appear to be affected by 
business cycles. This result, together with our inference mentioned 
before with regard to the impact of the cycle on non-durables, show 
that it was reasonable to split our analysis by these two types of 
goods. The reader may notice that, for the after liberalization period, 
the coefficients of M and CA remain significant after controlling for 
cyclical impact (the inclusion of DM, DK and DC A). A comparison 
between table 6 and 8 will show that, for all periods considered, the 
coefficient of CA remains significant as an explanatory variable after 
controlling for pro-cyclical behavior. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper looked for the determinants of price-cost margins. We 
found evidence that shows that the pro-competitive impact of im-
ports reduces the price-cost margins. We also found, consistent with 
traditional models of oligopoly, that the impact of concentration on 
price cost-margins is lower as we pass from the stage before the lib-
eralization process to the stage after the liberalization process. This 
evidence shows how competition from international products changes 
the price setting behavior of domestic firms. 
With regard to the impact of the business cycle on the behavior of 
price-cost margins, we found that, after the liberalization period, the 
margins are more anti-cyclical in concentrated industries. The story 
is consistent with that found in models of price wars during booms 
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991; 
and Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico, 2002). The signs and significance 
of the coefficients of our three main explanatory variables [CA, K and 
M) do not change with the introduction of the cyclical variables. 
Similarly to results found in other countries, we found that con-
centration affects the price setting behavior of durable goods. For the 
case of durables for the period 1986-1998, the inclusion of pro-cyclical 
variables does not change our basic inferences. For non-durables, and 
for this period, we find inferences changing with the inclusion of pro-
cyclical variables. Also, for non-durables, the behavior of concentra-
tion after the liberalization period is consistent with the story about 
price wars during economic booms. 
In the agenda for research we find the possibility of estimating 
the price-cost margin while measuring at the same time the impact of DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 197 
the variables studied. A possible line of research would be to estimate 
the price-cost margin a la Hall (1988) while allowing for the same 
variables used in this study to affect it (C4, M and K). 
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Appendix 1 
The data was obtained from the Encuesta industrial anual from 1980 
to 1998. The data set includes 205 industrial classes. We took off 
several classes for the following reasons: We needed classes that had 
information on concentration indexes, and we chose classes that did 
not produce miscellaneous goods. Also, we found the data unreliable 
for classes 311404, 311501, 311405, 361203, 381404, 381412, 382101, 
361201 y 361204. We kept 63 classes to run the regressions. 
The classes are the following: 
Class EIA 1994  Industrial Activity 
311101  Meat packing, preservation and preparation 
311201  Pasteurization and milk canning 
311203  Dry and condensed milk 
311301  Canned fruits and vegetables 
312110  Manufacturing of instant coffe 
311701  Manufacturing of oils, and butters 
312200  Manufacturing of animal foods 
311304  Fish and shellfish packing 
311903  Manufacturing of chewing gum 
312123  Manufacturing of starch and leaven 
313040  Manufacturing of malt 
313041  Manufacturing of beer 
314002  Manufacturing of cigarettes DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 199 
(continued) 
Class EIA 1994  Industrial Activity 
Textiles 
321202  Yarn and textile tissues of soft fibers 
(cotton, wool and synthetic fibers) 
321205  Yarn and finishing of artificial fiber 
321207  Finished of threads 
Wood 
331102  Manufacturing of wood 
Paper 
341010  Manufacturing of paper 
341022  Manufacturing of cardboard 
341031  Paper and cardboard containers 
Chemical 
351300  Cellulose and synthetic fibers 
352100  Pharmaceuticals 
352210  Varnish and lacquer 
352221  Perfumes and cosmetics 
352222  Soap y detergents 
351215  Other chemical 
351222  Insecticides 
352231  Adhesives 
352240  Manufacturing of other products of rubber 
355001  Manufacturing of tires 
Glass and cement 
362011  Flat glass and engraved glass 
362013  Glass fiber and mosaics 
362021  Glass containers and glass vials 
362022  Manufacturing of other glass products 
369111  Manufacturing of hydraulic cement 
Another Mineral Products 
361203  Manufacturing of bricks and 
non-refractory bricks 
Basic Metal 
371001  Manufacturing of iron and steel 
371006  Manufacturing of iron pipes and posts 200 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
(continued) 
Class EIA 1994  Industrial Activity 
372003  Melting of copper 
372005  Melting of aluminum 
Metal Products 
381300  Manufacturing of metal furniture 
381401  Manufacturing of tools 
381404  Manufacturing of metal wires 
381407  Manufacturing of iron containers 
Machinery and Equipment 
382101  Manufacturing and assembly of 
agricultural machines 
382202  Towing and crane machinery 
382205  Fire extinguishers 
382206  Manufacturing of electrical 
equipment and parts 
382301  Manufacturing and assemble 
of machines for offices 
383107  Manufacturing of batteries 
383109  Manufacturing of another 
electrical accessories 
383110  Manufacturing of light bulbs 
383201  Manufacturing of LPs and Radios 
383202  Manufacturing of other equipment 
and electrical equipment 
383205  Manufacturing of records and tapes 
Transport Equipment 
384110  Manufacturing and assembly of automobiles 
384121  Manufacturing of chassis for auto vehicles 
384122  Manufacturing of engines for automobiles 
384123  Manufacturing of vehicle transmissions 
384124  Manufacturing of parts for 
the suspension of automobile vehicles 
384125  Manufacturing of parts for the 
braking systems of automobiles 
383103  Manufacturing of parts for the 
electrical system of automobiles DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY MARGINS 201 
(continued) 
Class EI A 1994  Industrial Activity 
Other Manufacture Industries 
352233  Matches 
The data gives the level of investment at nominal prices and 
there is no information for capital assets. Thus, we calculated the 
capital assets by following the perpetual inventory model. We follow 
the methodology suggested in Nadiri and Prucha (1996) to calculate 
the initial stock of capital. In that paper they define the initial stock 
of capital as the level of investment divided by the rate of growth of 
the stock of capital and the average rate of growth of depreciation for 
the whole period. From that date on we calculate the stock by using 
the investment series at constant prices and the depreciation series 
(also at constant prices). 
To calculate the level of investment at constant prices, we de-
flated with an index obtained from the input-output matrix for var-
ious years. For each year we looked at the input-output matrix for 
that year (or the one for the closest year) and we trace, for each 
industry, the purchases of durables. We calculated the percentage 
share for each industry over the total purchases of durables made by 
the industry. With this information we constructed a weighted aver-
age price index by using the weights obtained from the input-output 
matrix, and the price indexes obtained from the national accounts 
information. All this procedure is done at the two digit level (since 
the input-output matrix is usually calculated at this level). For each 
class, we look at the corresponding two digit price index and we de-
flate the investment series with that index. For depreciation we use 
the same index to obtain real depreciation. 
Wages and value added were deflated with the implicit price se-
ries. For intermediate inputs, we used a similar procedure to the one 
expressed for investment and depreciation. The only difference was 
that we traced the purchases of non-durables. 202 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Appendix 2 
Table A.l 
Endogeneity Test for Table 2 
Whole Manufacturing Sector 
Chi Square Marginal Significance Levels 
CA  M*  CA and M* Together 
1980 - 1998  0.002965  0.676002  0.011241 
1980 - 1985  0.716642  0.891263  0.929889 
1986 - 1998  0.16893  0.421369  0.291823 
Table A.2 
Endogeneity Test for Table 3 
Whole Manufacturing Sector 
Chi Square Marginal Significance Levels 
CA  M/TS  CA and M/TS Together 
1980 - 1998  0.00362  0.993138  0.014298 
1980 - 1985  0.78854  0.834184  0.942965 
1986 - 1998  0.230047  0.923594  0.477737 
The instruments used for CA are the first two lagged values of 
the CA variable, and the first two lagged values of the capital output 
ratio. For M* the instruments used are the first two lagged values of 
M* the first two lagged values of the capital output ratio. For the 
test of CA and M* together we used the first two lagged values of the 
two variables together with the first two lagged values of the capital 
output ratio. A similar reasoning applies to M/TS. 